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Monetizing Diaspora: Liquid Sovereigns
and the Interest Convergence Around

Worker Remittances
Jose Gabilondo*
I.

Introduction

Larry Catdi Backer raises two issues in his Article on law in a postSoviet world on which I want to comment. First, Catd Backer considers
the relationship between law and "ethnos," which refers to the link
between an aggregate of people and a country's territory.' Law, he
notes, can both strengthen and weaken a people's tie to a country's
territory. 2 Second, he finds that the locus of public international lawmaking has shifted from traditional public law actors, like states and
treaty-based organizations, to private law actors: trans-national

corporations, the media, customers, nongovernmental organizations, and
markets themselves.3 In the new world order, these private law actors,
says Catd Backer, may have an "adverse interest dependency" resulting
in ad hoc alignments between interest groups with otherwise adverse
interests.4
This Article examines the relationship between law and ethnos and
"interest dependency" in the context of cross-border flows of money and
* Associate Professor, Raphael Diaz-Balart Hall, College of Law, Florida
International University, Miami, Florida, Jose.Gabilondo@fiu.edu. Harvard College,
B.A. 1987, J.D. 1991 University of California, Berkeley. The arguments in this Article
benefited from presentation and feedback at globalization panels at the 2005 Law and
Society Conference and the 2007 American Society for International Law Conference.
My grateful thanks go to Larry Cati Backer, Tim Canova, and Hannibal Travis for their
comments on earlier drafts.
1. Larry CatA Backer, Reifying Law-Government, Law and the Rule of Law in
GovernanceSystems, 26 PENN ST. INT'L L. REv. 521 (Winter 2008).
2. Id. at 522-23.
3. Id. at 546-48.
4. Id. at 548 ("These actors have interests, albeit fundamentally adverse interests,
yet are dependent on each other. That adverse interest dependency is deepened in a
system that increases the authority and legitimacy of each of the actors through their
regularized interactions.").
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other resources sent by overseas workers to a home country, so-called
"worker remittances." Worker remittances simultaneously strengthen
and weaken the link between a people and a country's territory,
enhancing the local prosperity of a home-country by splitting its citizens
between physical residents and diaspora workers.5 An opportunity for
some, rueful for others, emigrating to work is a fact of life for the
diaspora workers who generate these remittances and manna to those
who receive or traffic in them. Indeed, the liquidity which remittances
provide to labor-exporting countries has aligned these countries with
some labor-importing ones (where remittances are sourced) and with
treaty-based organizations charged with development and global
macroeconomic policy. It is a form of the interest dependency which
Catdt Backer identifies, albeit in the official sector.
The transaction costs of sending these remittances can be quite high
and workers have an identical interest in paying less to send money
home. Diaspora workers, though, have little recourse against these costs
in either their distant home country or the country of employment. Their
physical dispersion across labor-importing countries makes it difficult for
them to advocate for this interest.
Making matters worse,
"undocumented" workers lack not only suffrage in the employment
country but, importantly, the bargaining power in the open market
brought by legal status. This collective interest will remain underserved
by a public law system until it comes to terms with the reality of
employment-based migration. Foreseeable or, for many, inevitable
migration to escape economic hardship in the home country changes the
implicit bargain between the home country and its citizens, a bargain
which assumes a meaningful opportunity to reside in the country of one's
citizenship. This power dynamic bears generally on the bonds betweens
citizens and states, but this Article examines only the transaction costs of
remittances and official efforts to reduce them.
Labor-exporting countries, labor-importing ones, and treaty-based
organizations have recognized the need to lower transaction costs, but
their resulting initiatives tend to reflect a shared interest-convergence
that stops short of more basic improvements for these workers. Apart
from the claims which public law actors make on the remittance
waterfall, however, remittance liquidity is itself a new type of 'private
actor," which stands in for the collective interests (and efforts) of
diaspora workers. Given the growing significance of remittance liquidity
5. Remittances are "[clurrent transfers by migrants who are employed in new
economies and considered residents there. (A migrant is considered a person who comes
to an economy and stays, or is expected to stay, for a year or more). Workers remittances
often involve related persons."
INTERNATIONAL MONETARY FUND, BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS MANUAL

302 (3d ed. 1961).
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to both overseas workers and the usual public law actors, a more radical
approach is needed to reduce these transaction costs, one that tackles the
collective action problem on behalf of these workers.
Part II explains that, as remittance flows have increased, awareness
has grown that their transaction costs are onerous, adding to what are
already the substantial hardships of leaving a home country to work
abroad. Part III shows how three distinct sets of interests have come to
frame the debate on transaction costs. Some labor-exporting countries
have come to rely on the hard-currency foreign exchange made possible
by remittance liquidity, which may exceed the foreign exchange received
from borrowing, aid, or foreign investment.
In these countries,
remittance liquidity has produced face-saving prosperity for treaty-based
organizations charged with development, in particular the World Bank,
the International Monetary Fund, and regional development banks. On
the sending end of the remittance equation, counterterrorism programs in
labor-importing countries have targeted remittance transfers on the
theory that outbound remittances can help finance terrorism. These three
interests-the foreign financing needs of labor-exporting countries, the
reputational strategies of treaty-based organizations, and the security
programs of labor-importing countries-have converged to form a
particular policy approach to remittance policy, including the problem of
transaction costs. Moving from the conceptual to the practical, Part IV
concludes by recommending that the International Monetary Fund
establish a free or low-cost facility to transfer worker remittances. The
large-scale migrations which produce remittance flows are likely to
continue, as is the official interest-convergence about remittances. More
intervention by a treaty-based organization like the International
Monetary Fund could eliminate or reduce the additional transaction cost
burden to overseas workers consistent with the terms of the current
official interest-convergence.
II.

Transactions Costs

As employment-based migration has increased, so too have6
remittance flows, bringing public attention to their transaction costs.
Remittances tripled in dollar volume between 1990 and 2005. 7 The
actual figure may be higher because some remitters use informal
mechanisms, which do not report transaction volume.8 In several
6. Between 1970 and 2000, the percent of migrants in developed countries nearly
doubled. WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS: ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF
REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 27 (2006) [hereinafter GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS].
7. During this period, remittance flows jumped from 68 billion to 232 billion. Id. at
88. Many remittances are sent along informal methods which escape reporting. Id. at 86.
8. Caroline Freund and Nikola Spatafora, Remittances: Transaction Costs,
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countries, remittances are the largest source of foreign exchange flows,
exceeding the sum of foreign investment and official aid. 9 Many
remittances flow along major "corridors" between a labor-exporting
country and a labor-importing country.' 0 The largest corridors run to
labor-exporting countries such as China, India, Mexico, and the
Philippines. II Some labor-exporting countries harvest remittances by
requiring repatriation from offshore workers. 12
And with the growth of employment-based migration, worker
demand for sending remittances has produced a variety of transfer
mechanisms. Remitters send money home through postal services and
automated teller services offered by depository institutions. 13 Remitters
may also use a wide variety of informal transfer mechanisms, such as inkind payments, bearer-mechanisms like couriers, barter arrangements,
and so called "ethnic stores," which send money to home countries as14
part of their specialized goods and services for diaspora communities.
These informal systems may cost less than banks and other official
Determinants, and Informal Flows, World Bank, Working Paper 3704 (2005), available
at
http://www-wds.worldbank.org/servlet/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2005/08/30/
00001640620050830164556/Rendered/PDF/wps3704.pdf (last visited Dec. 4, 2007).
The World Bank estimates that imperfections in measurement and reporting remittances
might put the actual amount of these global flows at 50% more. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC
PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 85.
9. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 88.

10. For the United States, the Mexico-United States corridor is the most important
one in terms of volume. It has also generated a particular literature and set of policy
initiatives. See, e.g., Ratil Hernandez-Coss, The U.S. Mexico Remittance Corridor
Lessons on Shifting from Informal to Formal Transfer Systems, World Bank, Working
Paper No. 47 (2005), available at http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTAML/
Resources/3965 11-114658142787 1/US-MexicoRemittanceCorridor_.WP.pdf
(last
visited Dec. 4, 2007). Other important corridors include the Canada-Vietnam corridor
and the U.S.-Colombia corridor.
11. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 89.
12. The Philippines and Korea have both used forced remittance programs to
increase the repatriation of overseas workers' earnings. See Alexander C. O'Neill,
Emigrant Remittances: Policies to Increase Inflows and Maximize Benefits, 9 IND. J.
GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 345, 352-55 (2001) (broadly surveying remittance policies of less-

developed countries). Jamaica has also used forced remittances. An early example
involved the Mexican "bracero" program. See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra
note 6. See also David M. Forma, ProtectingPhilippine Overseas Contract Workers, 16
CoMp. LAB. L. 26 (1994) (describing government policy of encouraging migration and
describing mistreatment of foreign workers); Dan Gatmaytan, Death and the Maid:
Work, Violence, and the Filipinain the InternationalLabor Market, 20 HARV. WOMEN'S
L.J. 229 (1997).
13. Commercial banks are offering dual ATM cards upon opening an account
permitting the remitter to keep one at the host country and sending the other to the
beneficiary at the home country to easily access the funds for a nominal network fee. Id.
14. U.S. Dep't of Treas., A Report to the Congress in Accordance with Section 359
of the USA Patriot Act of 2001, Appendix A, at 19-22 (2002) [hereinafter Treasury
Report].
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mechanisms. 15 They may also allow remitters to remain anonymous and
to avoid legal requirements like taxes and currency reporting controls.16
For both senders and transfer agents, transaction costs are at the
heart of the remittance business. The transaction costs of these transfer
services include fees, exchange rate commissions, and the opportunity
cost to the recipient of the "float" captured by the transfer agent by
delaying access to the remitted funds. 17 Of course, transaction costs
reduce the net amount received in the home country. The World Bank
has found that:
[r]emittance fee pricing is complex, and rarely are senders informed
about the full and precise price of a remittance transaction. Fees may
be has high as 20 percent of the principal, depending on the
remittance amount, channel, corridor, and transaction type. The
average price is reported to have been around 12 percent of the
principal in 2004.... Prices are believed
to have declined but are
18
still very high in low-volume corridors.
And it is these "golden crumbs"-the transaction costs-that attract
firms to the transfer business, which enjoy economies of scale and
repetition. 19 For example, the World Bank estimates that the total cost to
a transfer agent-including staff time--of the first remittance transaction
for a particular client is $5.50, with costs dropping to $3.60 for
subsequent transfers and to $3.00 if electronic processing is used for the
transaction.20 So, even a "cheap" transfer cost of 5% on a $300
remittance, i.e., $15, leaves the transfer agent with a large profit margin,
especially if the remitter becomes a regular customer.
Aware that globalized workers may lack both market and legal
15. Walter Perkel, Note, Money Launderingand Terrorism:Informal Value Transfer
Systems, 41 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 183, 185-86 (2004) (thoughtfully arguing that the current
penal regime against IVTS will not work and advocating an incentive-based scheme to
formalize the informal sector).
16. U.S. Dep't of Treas., FinancialCrimes Enforcement Network, FinCen Advisory,
Issue 33, Mar. 2003, at 3, available at http://www.fincen.gov/advis33.pdf (last visited
Dec. 3, 2007) [hereinafter FinCen].
17. Manuel Orozco, Worker Remittances: in an InternationalScope, Inter-American
Dialogue (Mar. 2003).
18. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 137. See also Multilateral
Investment Fund, Inter-American Development Bank, Sending Money Home Remittances
as a Development Tool in Latin America and the Caribbean (Jan. 24-25, 2005)
(estimating that in 2003 there were 150 million transfers with an average value of $300)
[hereinafter Multilateral Investment Fund].
19. GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 140. For 2004, major money
transfer operators reported net operating profits of between 18 percent to 32 percent of
gross revenues. Id.
20. Id. at 140-44. The World Bank's methodology may not consider the costsavings from low-cost wire transfer services like the Mexico-Direct program mentioned.
See text, infra note 25.
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power in their home and employment countries, many recognize the need
for affirmative consumer protections, including lower transaction costs. 21
That is the approach taken in the Universal Declaration of the Rights of
Financial and Banking Services Users, promoted by a non-governmental
organization which advocates on behalf of retail consumers with crossborder financial needs.22 Related bills to increase the transparency of
costs for remittance senders have also been introduced in the United
States Congress. 23
Labor-exporting countries and treaty-based
organizations agree in general terms on what should be done to reduce
these costs: compel the transfer agent to disclose the overall cost of the
transaction and foster competition between different transfer agents.2 4
For example, the Federal Reserve has established a low-cost wire
transfer service for transfers in outbound remittance transfers from the
United States to Mexico.25
The costs should come down, of course, but my point is that the
transaction cost problem is part of a more basic dynamic of globalization
policies which encourage the circulation of capital, be it in the form of
people, cash, goods, or services. Freeing capital creates random
efficiencies and, with them, prosperity bubbles; but, for public policy
makers at least, fixating on these efficiencies and bubbles outside of their
21. See State Dep't Fact Sheet, Declaration of Nuevo Le6n, Special Summit of the
Americas, Monterrey, Mex. (Jan. 2004), available at http://www.state.gov/p/wha/rls/
fs/28148.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2007).
[R]emittances are an important source of capital in many countries of the
Hemisphere. We commit to take concrete actions to ... reduc[e] by at least
half the regional average cost of these transfers no later than 2008 ...
promot[e] competition between the providers of these services, [and]
eliminat[e] regulatory obstacles and other restrictive measures that affect the
cost of these transfers....
Id. The Summit of the Americas is a multilateral legal and policy forum organized in
large part by the Organization of American States. See also Universal Declarationof the
Rights
of
Financial and Banking
Services
Users,
available at
http://www.ausbancintemacional.org/jomadas/AusbanclnternacionalV/DeclaracionUnive
rsal/declaracioneng.pdf (last visited on Jan. 3, 200) (sponsored by a non-governmental
organization which advocates for consumers with financial needs that span several
jurisdiction) [hereinafter Universal Declaration].
22. See Universal Declaration,supra note 21.
23. International Remittance Consumer Protection Act of 2005, S. 31, 109th Cong.
(1st Sess.) (introduced as H.R. 928).
24. See Multilateral Investment Fund, supra note 18. See also Monetary and
Financial Systems Department, Regulatory Frameworks for Hawala and Other
Remittance Systems (Fund 2005); Mohammed El Qorchi et al., Informal Funds Transfer
Systems: An Analysis of the Informal Hawala System (Fund 2003); Samuel Munzele
Maimbo et al., Migrant Labor Remittances in South Asia (Bank 2005).
25. See Directo a M~xico to Visit 12 Cities, Demonstrate Innovative New Tool (May
6, 2006), http://www.frbservices.org/Retail/pdf/DirectoMexico -Release05O2O6.pdf (last
visited Jan. 3, 2008) (stressing the cost advantages of the service). The implication of
this scale economy for the transaction costs faced by individuals who remit along lesstraveled remittance paths is that cost savings may be less likely.
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larger context is opportunistic.
Commenting on the neo-liberal
"euphoria" which follows capital flows into the developing world, one
World Bank economist hinted at the larger context for remittances and
the ensuing prosperity which many have touted:
As with the euphoria surrounding private capital flows in the mid1990s, the attractiveness of remittances is in part a reaction to failures
of earlier development mantras.... Remittances strike the right
cognitive chords. They fit in with a communitarian "third way" and
exemplify the principle of self-help. People from poor countries can
just migrate and send back money that not only helps their families,
but the host and recipient countries
as well.... What could be
26
better? Are these hopes valid?
He makes an important point about why the remittance model for
the developing world is seductive: propelled by the self-combustion of
work, thrift, and personal sacrifice, it works without much government
intervention or coordination. And, like water after a long thirst,
remittances promise quick relief to many, so long as one overlooks the
hardship to workers and their families of abandoning home to work in a
foreign country. Remittance "euphoria," then, rests on a political
philosophy that seems somewhat hostile to active government
intervention and willing to assume away some of the suffering of the
underlying workers whose surplus value makes the model possible. The
next Part examines how this point of view reflects the shared interests of
labor-exporting countries, labor-importing ones, and treaty-based
organizations-the traditional public law actors.
III. The Interest Copula Around Remittances
In his Article, Catd Backer explains law in terms of the "force
relations" which Foucault suggested drive action.27 This involves seeing
"through" visible forms of law to see how force plays on and through
individuals and institutions. 28 In the traditional public international law
landscape, one had to "pierce" formal institutions to see the de facto
force relations identified by Foucault. In Catd Backer's model, though,
norm production disperses away from traditional actors to private law
actors, making it easier to map the structure of de facto force relations
because the force relations have been "positivized" through the agency of
these private law actors. In this revised landscape, Catd Backer observes
26. Devesh Kapur, Remittances: The New Development Mantra, in REMITTANCES
DEVELOPMENT IMPACT AND FuTuRE PROSPECTS 331, 331-60 (Samuel Munzele Maimbo &
Dilip Ratha eds., 2005).
27. Cati Backer, supranote 1, at 551.

28.

Id.
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an "adverse interest dependency" between these private law actors.29
To explain how the current policy approach to the transaction cost
problem with remittances has emerged, I use a related concept
introduced by Derrick Bell: interest-convergence. 30 Bell explained the
marginal legal gains which African-Americans received in Brown v.
Board of Education in terms of an ad hoc alignment between the
otherwise adverse interests of blacks and whites in formal racial equality:
"[T]his principle of 'interest-convergence' provides: The interest of
blacks in achieving racial equality will be accommodated only when it
converges with the interests of whites." An early example of critical law
and economics, Bell's argument has been widely used in critical race
theory.3'
An interest-convergence argument reveals a previously hidden
effect of power by finding an implicit bargain between the interests of a
subordinated constituency and those of a dominant constituency-a
bargain which benefits the subordinated constituency. In this case, the
dominant interests are labor-exporting countries, labor-importing ones,
and treaty-based organizations; the subordinated party is the overseas
worker; and the "benefit" is the campaign to reduce transaction costs for
remitters. The following discussion lays out the three dominant interests:
the foreign financing interests of labor-exporting countries, the security
interests of labor-importing ones, and the reputational interests of treatybased organizations. Each is an example of the "self-interest leverage"
which Bell explains lies behind an ad hoc interest-convergence. The
official campaign to reduce transaction costs may marginally benefit
some overseas workers but it does so only insofar as it also benefits each
of the dominant interests. Moreover, these approaches to reducing
transaction costs reaffirm the basic terms of the current institutional
arrangement, rather than asking-as is justified-whether new patterns
of work-based migration call for a more radical approach to protect
growing numbers of diaspora workers.
Which is not to suggest that these interests are perfectly aligned.
States and treaty-based countries may disagree, as the Asian
29. Id. at 548.
30. Derrick Bell, Brown v. Board of Education and the Interest-Convergence
Dilemma, 93 HARV. L. REV. 518 (1980).
31. See, e.g., Richard Delgado, Rodrigo's Roundelay: Hernandez v. Texas and the
Interest-Convergence Dilemma, 41 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 23, 42 (2006) ("[U]sing
character to apply ... interest-convergence explains Hernandez at least as convincingly
as it does Brown v. Board of Education."); and Gil Gott, A Tale of New Precedents:
JapaneseAmerican InternmentAs ForeignAffairs Law, 40 B.C. L. REV. 179, 264 (1998)
("The interest convergence approach is significant for race-critical foreign affairs legal
scholarship because it combines the study of domestic race relations with an awareness of
conditions in the external realm.").
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Development Bank and the government of the Philippines recently did
over what the government planned to do with the proceeds of some
remittances securitization. 32 Nor is it to suggest that the countries and
treaty-based organizations act only on the basis of opportunistic selfinterest, a point made by Bell when he noted the moral commitments of
abolitionists and white advocates of formal racial equality.33 Conceding
that these institutional actors have mixed motives, the point is that major
programmatic changes-like the kind involved in reducing these
transaction costs-occur only when a critical mass of interests forms
strong enough to overcome institutional inertia. Interest-convergence
analysis reveals the patterns of interest alliance which pre-exist and, most
likely, will survive any particular reform. For that reason, taking life as
it is, I build on the current interest-convergence when recommending in
Part IV that the International Monetary Fund establish a free or low-cost
remittance transfer facility.
A.

The ForeignFinancingInterest of Labor-ExportingCountries

Because of some unique characteristics as a source of hard-currency
foreign exchange, remittances have become central to how some laborexporting countries manage their financing of foreign transactions.
Remittances give recipients hard currency (or its local currency value)
with which they can pay for consumption in the home country.34 As
reserves of this hard-currency build up, the home country can service
foreign currency-denominated public debt, pay for imports, and,
32. In this case, the Asian Development Bank did not want the government to absorb
the remittances into its general budget: "We don't want the money to flow to the
government," Belton [an ADA official] said. "We think it's much more efficient to get
the money into the private sector and have rational market economics dictate it rather
than simply make it another form of government borrowing." Doris Dumlao, Bonds
Backed by OFW Pushed, PHIL. DAILY INQUIRE 13 (Nov. 14, 2005), available at 2005
WLNR 18399408.
33. As Bell points out, moral interests played a role in judicial cases which tried to
dismantle segregation but it was only when these interests were added to the aggregate of
self-interests that institutions went into action to formally repudiate race-based
desegregation. "Here, as in the abolition of slavery, there were whites for whom
recognition of the racial equality principle was sufficient motivation. But, as with
abolition, the number who would act on morality alone was insufficient to bring about the
desired racial reform." See Bell, supra note 30, at 525.
34. In this sense, the liquidity windfall to a home government from remittances
mirrors the way in which liquidity in a private firm increases managers' freedom to
switch between alternative investments, including those that would lead to the most
perquisite consumption. Cf George Triantis, Organizationsas Internal CapitalMarkets:
The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable
Enterprises, 117 HARV. L. REv. 1102 (2004) (modeling a firm as an internal capital pool
in which legal restrictions on liquidity restrict managerial discretion, including the
freedom to consume perquisites).
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generally, improve its balance of payments position vis-A-vis other
countries. Labor-exporting home countries, then, are one leg of the
interest-convergence stool. These countries can also get hard currency
inflows by borrowing, through inbound foreign investment, and in the
form of foreign aid, but these are quid pro quo transactions which
obligate the country in some way, typically with an offsetting financial
claim. What makes remittances attractive to countries is that these flows
are "unrequited transfers," which come with no strings attached.35 And
remittance flows are less prone to the external economic shocks that
make quid pro quo foreign financing volatile as fickle investors react to
market changes. 36 Conditions in the country of employment-for
example, an immigration reform-can, however, make remittance
liquidity volatile to a home country.
For some labor-exporting countries, the foreign financing
advantages of remittances have amended the basic terms of the bond
between citizen and state. If a citizen produces more foreign exchange
as a migrant worker than as a home country resident, a country has a
plausible interest in encouraging its nationals to work abroad, perhaps
indefinitely. 37 Doing so may bring in more hard currency foreign
exchange into the local economy although, as has been noted, it can also
discourage the home country government from trying to foster local
employment. 38 As Anupam Chander has noted, some labor-exporting
35. In other words, in exchange for a resident of Country A issuing an outflow of
value to a resident of Country B, the Country A resident acquires a claim on a Country B
resident. In contrast, unrequited transfers involve a one-way transfer of value-with no
offsetting consideration-from a resident of one country to a resident of another. See
generally Chantal Thomas, Balance-of-Payments Crises in the Developing World:
Balancing Trade, Finance and Development in the New Economic Order, 15 AM. U.
INT'L L. REv. 1249 (2000) (analyzing balance-of-payments crises in the developing world
and illustrating how a country's current and capital accounts balance may interact
negatively).
36. This counter-cyclicality of remittances has been noted: "Remittance flows are
much more stable than private capital flows, which exhibit strong herd like behavior,
amplifying the boom-bust cycles in many emerging markets." See Kapur, supra note 26,
at 338.
37. Anupam Chander, HomewardBound, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 60,67-68 (2006).
Today, national policies train people to be emigrants. The Philippines requires
exit lessons of its emigrants, even supplying a handbook, now in its sixth
edition. People now rank among many nations' most important exports. A
public policy towards emigrants is even more important for countries such as
the Philippines; one out of every eleven Filipinos lives abroad." (internal
citation omitted).
Id.
38. Indeed, this has been identified as a key issue in managing remittance flows:
"Remittances inflow might have negative effects as well. If the recipient country remains
dependent on money transfers, it will encourage further migration of labor by reducing
the effectiveness of investments of domestic and foreign investors because of the unstable
workforce." Ardian Fulani, Governor of the Bank of Albania, Key Policy Issues for
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countries use "bonding mechanisms" to foster cultural and economic ties
with their expatriates. 39 The bonding mechanisms described by Chander
help to conserve the value of what may be for some countries their most
important income-producing assets-mobile citizens.
Countries that systematically export part of their citizenry suggest a
commodity theory of citizenship in which the home country uses foreign
labor markets to better capture the surplus value of citizens. It is a form
of citizen "arbitrage," hence the Article's title of "monetizing diaspora."
Doing so lets these countries better serve their local citizens, but the
practice disrupts the understanding that citizenship involves meaningful
access to physical residence on a country's soil. Any perspective that
frames remittances primarily in the context of the interests of countries,
then, may overlook fundamental questions about how remittances change
the bargain between the citizen and the country. When such a
perspective is endorsed by treaty-based organizations-as the next
section shows-debates about the terms of the bargain recede further into
the background.
B.

The InstitutionalInterests of InternationalOrganizations

The second leg of the interest-convergence stool around remittance
prosperity is made up of the World Bank ("Bank"), the International
Monetary Fund ("Fund"), and other treaty-based international financial
institutions like regional development banks (collectively, "IFIs"). The
IFIs have jumped on the remittance bandwagon, as suggested by the high
volume of policy and programs devoted to this subject. 40 Obviously,
institutions whose mandate is to promote development would welcome
the developing country prosperity made possible by remittances. This
prosperity might suggest that the IFIs had succeeded in meeting their
development mandate. The irony is that the prosperity reflects massive
displacements of workers from developing countries where IFI policies
Remittances in Transition Economies-a View Point From a Recipient Country,
Conference of the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (Sept. 28, 2005).
39. Chander, supra note 37 (summarizing and assessing the lawfulness under U.S.
law of political and economic bonding mechanisms used by labor-exporting countries).
As economic and trade liberalization brought increased prosperity to the world
in the 1990s, developing countries saw their diasporas as a key to opening their
economies to international trade and investment. But they also came to
recognize that the diaspora did not automatically maintain relationships with its
homeland and that such relationships required cultivation. Rather than seek to
adopt coercive measures such as taxing the diaspora [as suggested by Jagdish
Bhagwati], states sought to nurture connections to the diaspora through other
means. I will call these "bonding" mechanisms.
Id. at 67.
40. See, e.g., GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6; Freund and Spatafora,
supra note 8; Kapur, supra note 26; and Hernandez-Coss, supra note 10.
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have had little seeming effect.41 Granted, the Bank has quietly noted that
immigration and remittances do not cure chronic underdevelopment and
inequality; 42 but this is only a minor chord in the policy positions of the
IFIs.
The Fund merits special attention because remittances figure
directly into the Fund's evolving role in monitoring the balance-ofpayments between countries. The Fund has lost core functions as private
markets have made more borrowing available to the Fund's country
members.43 The Fund has responded by offering more services to its
constituencies, i.e., the least-developed countries who may not access the
Euro-market.44 When it was established, the Fund concentrated on
helping members manage short-term balance of payments but its role has
shifted to longer-term financing of countries, in effect, lengthening the
term of the Fund's involvements with member countries. 45 Also, when
established, the Fund monitored the exchange rate parity system which
members maintained for their currencies, but countries no longer follow
that system, leading the Fund to expand its surveillance of members'
cross-border transactions.4 6
41. Kapur, supra note 26, at 339.
42. Coming in a single sentence out of a volume on remittances, this is only a mild
admonition:
The money that migrants send home-remittances-is an important source of
extra income for migrants' families and for developing countries: in aggregate,
remittances are more than twice as [sic] the size of international aid flows.
However, migration should not be viewed as a substitute for economic
development in the origin country-development ultimately depends on sound
domestic economic policies.
See GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at xi.
43. Dominique Carreau, Why Not Merge the International Monetary Fund (IMF)
With The InternationalBank for Reconstruction and Development (World Bank)?, 62
FORDHAM L. REv. 1989, 1997-98 (1994) (arguing that the Fund and the Bank's functions
have converged such that formal merger is called for). For example, during the Fund's
first twenty years, more than half of its resources were dedicated to helping industrialized
countries-including the United States and Great Britain-with their balance of
payments problems. Balakrishnan Rajagopal, From Resistance to Renewal: The Third
World, Social Movements, and the Expansion of InternationalInstitutions, 41 HARV.
INT'L L.J. 529, 569-70 (2000) (urging that the Fund take into account more non-economic
concerns as part of its expanded activities in the Third World).
44. Id. at 1998 (noting the Fund's establishment of special financing mechanisms for
least developed countries). For a description of some of these lending facilities, see John
W. Head, Seven Deadly Sins: An Assessment of Criticisms Directedat the International
Monetary Fund, 52 KAN. L. REv. 521 (2004) [hereinafter Seven Dealy Sins].
45. See Carreau, supra note 43, at 1993-98.
46. This argument by a Fund employee explains the increased emphasis on
surveillance as a mere expansion of a long-standing function:
[I]t should be noted that although surveillance was always at the core of the
IMF's activities, the term, as such, did not appear in the international economic
vocabulary until after the abandonment of the par value system.... Since then,
however, the rules and parameters of international behavior have become less
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These changes to the Fund's mandate have been reflected in formal
amendments to the Fund's organic law. Since its establishment at the
Bretton Woods Conference of 1944, 47 the Fund's Articles of Agreements
has been amended three times: first in 1969 to introduce the Fund's unit
of account (the Special Drawing Right); 48 again in 1978 to reflect the
abandonment of the gold standard and fixed exchange rates by member
countries; 49 and, most recently, in 1992 to permit the Fund to impose
special sanctions on members with substantial arrears in loan payments5 0
Not surprisingly, critics have accused the Fund of mission creep. 5I The
Fund has admitted as much, as suggested by comments by its Managing
Director about how globalization has changed the Fund's mission:
"twenty-first century globalization. .. has altered the context of the
Fund's mission.., and exposed gaps in the day-to-day work of the
Fund.... ,52

Moreover, among the IFIs, the Fund's governance structure lends
itself to convergence with member states. The Fund's primary reliance
on internal executive organs for dispute settlement intensifies the Fund's
close link with its country members.5 3 As the Fund's most noted legal
transparent, and consequently a need has developed for the function of
surveillance to become explicit as the vehicle to monitor the exercise of
[member state] discretion....
Manuel Guitidn, The Unique Nature of the Responsibilities of the InternationalMonetary
Fund, Pamphlet Series No. 46 (Fund 1992).
47. See Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund art. I(iv), Dec. 27,
1945, 60 Stat. 1401,2 U.N.T.S. 39.
48. Amendment of Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, May
31, 1968,20 U.S.T. 2775, 726 U.N.T.S. 266.
49. Second Amendment to the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, Apr. 30, 1976, 29 U.S.T. 2203, T.I.A.S. No. 8937.
50. Third Amendment of the Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary
Fund, Nov. 11, 1992, 31 I.L.M. 1307, 1309-10. See also John W. Head, Suspension of
Debtor Countries' Voting Rights in the IMF: An Assessment of the Third Amendment to
the IMF Charter, 33 VA. J. INT'L L. 591, 607-12 (1993) (discussing the public
international law sources of implied powers of international organizations, including the
Fund).
51. See Robert Hockett, From Macro to Micro to "Mission-Creep": Defending the
IMF's Emerging Concern with the Infrastructural Prerequisites to Global Financial
Stability, 41 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 153, 156-57 (2002). For a good summary of these
and other criticisms of the Fund, see Head, Seven Deadly Sins, supra note 44, at 521-30,
541-42 (2004) (concurring at 553-54 with Hockett's argument that expansion of Fund's
legal authorities and operations are consistent with the Fund's Articles of Agreement).
52. International Monetary Fund, The Managing Director's Report on the Fund's
Medium-Term Strategy, Sept. 15, 2005, http://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2006/
040506.pdf (last visited Jan. 3, 2008) (noting the implication of globalization on the
Fund's activities in surveillance, lending, and institutional governance).
53. The Fund is one of only a handful of international organizations which
internalize dispute resolution this way. Jost ALvAREZ, INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS
As LAW-MAKERS 441-46 (Oxford 2005). The Fund prefers to characterize this process as
"interpretation" rather than dispute settlement. Id. at 442.
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observer (and an insider as Fund general counsel) has noted, much of the
Fund's current regulation involves so called "soft" law, which is
deliberately vague and relies on ongoing good faith compliance by
members with the intent of Fund policies.54 This mix of private
settlement of disputes between the Fund and its members and vague legal
expectations of members make the Fund especially prone to alignment
with member countries, particularly its representatives from home
country banking and finance sectors.
C.

Remittance Discourses as Counterterrorism

The final leg of the interest-convergence around remittances is the
counterterrorism campaign of labor-importing countries, in particular the
United States. Since the World Trade Center bombings in 2001, the U.S.
government has launched a multi-pronged attack on terrorism, including
its financing. To reach the sources of terrorist fmancing, Congress
amended the Bank Secrecy Act of 1970 and the Money Laundering
Control Act of 1986 and enacted the Uniting and Strengthening America
by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to Intercept and Obstruct
Terrorism Act of 2001 ("Patriot Act").55 In the counterterrorism
paradigm, remittances can be used to finance terrorism, especially when
For example, the U.S.
sent along informal transfer networks.
exist between
Department of Treasury has asserted that "direct links" 56
informal value transfer mechanisms and terrorist financing.
However, the profile of suspicious transactions identified by the
Treasury in its counterterrorism campaign bears little resemblance to the
recurring small-dollar transfers which make up the bulk of the remittance
market.57 The Treasury's initial policy analysis of informal transfer
54. See Joseph Gold, Strengthening the Soft International Law of Exchange
Arrangements, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 443, 457 (1983) (tracing the increase in the number of
supermajority voting requirements-which increase the power of the United States and
other major shareholders-and the supermajority threshold up to 85 percent for decisions
about exchange arrangements since the establishment of the Fund).
55. Perkel, supra note 15, at 185-86 (arguing that the current penal regime against
IVTS will not work and advocating an incentive-based scheme to formalize the informal
sector).
56. Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 6 ("While it appears that the majority of IVTS
activity is legitimate in purpose, these systems have been used to facilitate the financing
of terrorism and in furtherance of criminal activities.") (citation omitted). FinCen
suggests that IVTS are used "frequently" for terrorist financing: "Recent law enforcement
investigations have shown direct links between criminal elements and the use of IVTS
mechanisms for the purpose of moving and laundering illicit proceeds. In addition, law
enforcement officials in India and other countries have identified terrorist organizations
that frequently utilize IVTS to move terrorist funds." FinCen, supra note 16, at 3.
57. FinCen's guidelines, which financial institutions are expected to use to monitor
suspicious transactions, apply primarily to "wholesale" transactions made up of carefully
structured large dollar value transfers by institutions or groups. For example, the
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mechanisms was based on the hawala network, an informal funds
transfer system used in the Arab and Islamic worlds.58 The original
nexus between remittances and terrorist financing was never very strong,
resting on a handful of incidents since 199 1.59 A global study of the use
of informal transfer networks mentions without substantiating one
60
possible incident involving the use of these networks for terrorism.
The link between hawala networks and terrorism was weak to begin with
and it becomes weaker still when universalized as a general approach to
Moreover, terrorists may use formal transfer
terrorist financing.61
mechanisms too, as suggested by some Western Union receipts found in
in Great Britain as part of a conspiracy to
a "bomb factory" discovered
62
commit air terrorism.
Nevertheless, the counterterrorist approach to remittances has been
a key part of the U.S. government's international criminal enforcement
programs and its domestic banking supervision programs. The U.S.
Treasury's Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering
("FATF"), in particular, provides guidance on "best practices" in
FATF encourages countries to discourage
remittance transfers.63
guidelines tell financial institutions to be on the look out for "sudden and/or unexplained
deposits of cash ... large and/or mixed deposits of cash and monetary instruments....
Structured cash deposits are made subsequently followed by international wire
transfers.... Structured cash purchases of monetary instruments .. " Id. at 9. These
guidelines seem well-suited for large-scale money laundering, but not for the average
immigrant worker.
58. Treasury Report, supra note 14, at 5-6.
59. Perkel, supra note 15, at 183.
60. Funded by the Dutch Ministry of Justice, the report involved archival research
and interviews law enforcement agents and academics from the U.S., Canada, Great
Britain, France, Australia, Hong Kong, Germany, South Africa, India, and Russia.
Although the report notes other illegal uses of these transfer networks, the only incident
of alleged terrorism culled from this research does seem flimsy:
It has also been alleged that an Indian named Amir Bhai, who illegally ran his
currency exchange business from Dubai, London and Hong Kong, and was not
very discriminate about his customers used to accept money for Indian
politicians and bureaucrats. He is said to have served Kashmiri activists and
those who had planted bombs in Bombay in 1991.
NIKOS PASSAS, INFORMAL VALUE TRANSFER SYSTEMS AND CRIMINAL ORGANIZATIONS: A
STUDY INTO So-CALLED UNDERGROUND BANKING NETWORKS 42 (1999).

61. This statement is subject to only some exceptions. The terrorist financing
involved in the Iran-Contra controversy did involve informal value transfer systems.
62. Formal value transfer systems can also help fund terrorism, perhaps more
reliably. See Don Van Natto, Jr. et al., In Tapes, Receipts and a Diary, Details of the
British Terror Case, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2006, at Al (mentioning the Western Union
receipts found in a "bomb factory" in Great Britain).
63. The counter-terrorism campaign of the United States asserts that informal value
transfer mechanisms for remittances may support terrorist financing. Therefore, the U.S.
Treasury's Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering ("FATF") strongly
encourages countries to discourage informal funds transfer systems and to impose
FATF,
registration and oversight requirements on money transfer services.
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informal funds transfer systems and to impose registration and oversight
64
requirements on money transfer services. The goal is to keep remitters
from using informal transfer mechanisms, like ethnic stores, and to direct
workers to use regulated financial intermediaries from whom
government agencies can more easily gather surveillance data. As a part
of anti-money laundering compliance, banking regulators have advised
their regulated depository institutions against maintaining correspondent
accounts for money transfer businesses. 65 In particular, the operations of
foreign money transfer agencies have come under increased scrutiny by
Recommendation VI, 9 Special Recommendations on Terrorist Financing (amended in
Oct. 2004). The remedy urged by the U.S. security establishment-operating through the
IFIs-is to encourage remitters to use formal mechanisms rather than informal ones. So,
for example, banking regulators have advised their regulated depository institutions
against maintaining correspondent accounts for certain money transfer businesses. See,
e.g., Comptroller of the Currency, Bank Secrecy Act/Anti-Money Laundering: Guidance
on Money Services Business Customers, Advisory Letter 2004-07 (June 4, 2004).
Even the World Bank, though, has criticized the closing of these correspondent bank
accounts. See GLOBAL PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 147. ("Clear guidance on how to
assess risks and spot suspicious activity is lacking.") (internal citation omitted). For a
more general discussion about how post-911 regulatory requirements may involve
overreaction and may require a more nuanced look at the actual relationship between
modes of money transfer and terrorist activity, see id. at 146-47.
64. FATF strongly recommends that countries impose registration requirements on
money transfer providers and that they adopt FATF's recommendations generally:
Each country should take measures to ensure that persons or legal entities,
including agents, that provide a service for the transmission of money or value,
including transmission through an informal money or value transfer system or
network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the FATF
Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions.
Each country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this
service illegally are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions.
FATF, supra note 63, at 2.
Many of the Patriot Act provisions on the financial system are simply the reception
into domestic banking law of FATF's Forty Recommendations, a comprehensive
approach to generating policy and institutions designed to combat money laundering. See
FATF, Forty Recommendations (2003).
65. See, e.g., Comptroller of the Currency, supra note 63. The Letter tells national
banks that they can rely as a measure of compliance on a letter which money service
businesses receive when they register with the U.S. Treasury's Financial Crimes
Enforcement Network ("FINCEN"). Id. One problem with the Letter is that it provides a
minimum amount of supervisory guidance for banks interested in complying with the due
diligence requirements in §302 of the Patriot Act. The Letter describes what compliance
would look like on a number of complex fronts without identifying the standard of
supervisory review which national banks must meet in order to satisfy their banking
supervisor:
A reasonable due diligence program under this section is one that comports
with industry best practices and should include, in addition to the items listed
above, consideration of foreign licensing requirements and restrictions, the
condition of regulation and supervision in the customer's country, and money
laundering risks associated with that country.
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virtue of the Patriot Act.66 As a result, these depository institutions have
closed many correspondent accounts, causing remitters to look elsewhere
for transfer services. 7
The counterterrorist approach to remittances also involves social
engineering away from an economy based on trust to one based on
formal exchange between anonymous counterparties. 68 To some extent,
it is cultural bonds between users and providers of informal networks
which provide the legal certainty for the transaction; so a transfer may
leave no record. 69 Granted, forcing consumers to shift from an informal
transfer mechanism based on trust to a formal one may increase her
financial literacy, but such "benevolent" intentions may thwart a
consumer's preference to deal with her own kind.7 °
66. See registration requirements of §312, Patriot Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5318(i). See also
Perkel, supra note 15 (assuming that informal value transfer systems materially
contribute to money laundering and arguing for incentives to encourage registration of
money transfer businesses).
67. The World Bank report on remittances notes how the regulatory reaction in the
U.S. has made possible the first step in disintermediation from informal to more formal
mechanisms for money transfer:
Since early 2005, correspondent bank accounts of hundreds of money service
businesses in the United States have been closed by banks for fear that they
may be targeted by [bank regulatory] authorities for servicing customers
regarded as "high risk." . . . Clear guidance on how to assess risks and spot
suspicious activity is lacking.
GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS, supra note 6, at 147. See id. at 146-47, for a more
general discussion about how post-91 1 regulatory requirements may involve overreaction
and may require a more nuanced look at the actual relationship between modes of money
transfer and terrorist activity.
68. Rachana Pathak, Note, The Obstacles to Regulating the Hawala: A Cultural
Norm or a Terrorist Hotbed, 27 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 2007, 2009 (2004) ("By offering
tangible alternatives to convince people to switch to institutionalized banking, the United
States would be taking a more international, culturally and economically sensitive
approach.").
69. Referring to an example involving the transfer through an informal transfer
mechanism by a Pakistani immigrant in the U.S. to a relative in India, one advocate of the
U.S. policies against informal transfer systems notes the alarming implications of shared
cultural assumptions between the customer and the service provider:
Most transactions do not involve the physical or electronic transfer of money
but merely an exchange of debts. Second, the IVTS is based on trust. In the
example above, the customer in the U.S. received no official receipt for his
deposit, and the dealer in Pakistan knew that the U.S. dealer would repay the
debt. Finally, transactions as simple as this involve very limited paperwork. In
this example, no receipts were generated and no names were recorded. These
three characteristics make the IVTS system a desirable way to transfer funds
for illicit purposes.
Perkel, supra note 15, at 190.
70. In this sense, the preference to use an informal transfer mechanism may be an
example of the type of positive discrimination in favor of one's own, which diaspora
theory urges domestic authorities to recognize as a valid legal expectation.
The diaspora model would review discrimination in favor of other diaspora
members [for example, by waiving the demand for a receipt to prove a financial
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IV. A Multilateral Remittance Transfer Facility
Legal reform (or at least preparatory reflection) is needed to make
law more responsive to the social reality that many workers may now
spend the bulk of their productive life in self-imposed diaspora, between
a home country and an employment country. In the conclusion to his
Article, Catd Backer suggests that the new international legal order
actually reflects the traditional influence of custom and practice in public
international law:
[T]he law/power relationship being constructed outside of the formal
structures of traditional public law shares a certain similarity to law
in its pre-Enlightenment forms.... The new law/power matrix is
custom and practice backed by social and economic power.
The same is true about the law of remittances. No major statutory or
treaty-based efforts have been proposed to coordinate the reduction
globally of remittance transaction costs. Instead, the problem has been
left to the voluntary practices of transfer agents, coaxed along by
alliances between countries and the IFIs.
The scope and complexity of remittance liquidity, though, call for
more multilateral coordination and, although it has become a four letter
word in the neo-liberal register, intervention. Foreign workers have a
shared interest in a less expensive way to send money home but,
dispersed across labor-importing countries, they cannot meaningfully
advance this interest through advocacy or suffrage in either their home or
employment countries. Bilateral reforms, like the Federal Reserve
transfer facility between the United States and Mexico, have reduced
transaction costs in the most highly-trafficked remittance corridors, but
encouraging competition and cost transparency are unlikely to work for
foreign workers not in a major corridor. A cross-border collective action
problem like this is best addressed through some official multilateral
remedy.
Given the Fund's mandate over international payments, it is a
natural vehicle for any serious reform to reduce the transaction costs of
worker remittances.
Remittances figure in both the Fund's
responsibilities for global financial surveillance and its role in the
"establishment of a multilateral system of payments in respect of current
transactions," criteria from the Fund's organic law.72 Specifically, the
deposit] with great care. While discrimination based on identity might seem to
violate the goal of equality, the model would appreciate that the discrimination
might be based on a desire for community.
Chandler, supra note 34.
71. CatA Backer, supranote 1, at 551.
72. Art. I(iv), Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund, supra note
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Fund could facilitate remittance transfers through a free or low-cost
transfer facility implemented through its member countries' banking
systems, a project which the Fund is in a unique position to coordinate.
Granted, an intervention like this might offend some radical notions
about economic liberty to the extent that foreign workers would receive a
banking service not available to domestic workers. But these notions rest
on an implicit bargain between citizens and states, which does not apply
to citizens who have entered a condition of partial statelessness in order
to work. If the bargain has changed, then the whole paradigm needs
rethinking. Apart from ideological objections, a free or subsidized
facility would have some important losers too, mainly the private transfer
agents who would see their remittance transfer business move to Fundsponsored facilities.
Such a facility would be consistent with the Fund's recent policies
of providing more financial services to developing countries and of
nodding to external stakeholders who may have little other formal
redress against the Fund.7 3 Operating such a facility might have been
ultra vires when the Fund was established to serve discrete functions in
the balance of payments, but it gets harder to make that argument as the
Fund continually reinvents itself to remain relevant in globalized trading
market. Overseeing remittance transfers would also make the Fund more
effective at conducing counterterrorist surveillance, discussed above as
another major factor in how the debate on remittances is framed. Getting
the Fund to implement a remittance facility would itself require a major
interest-convergence and a consultative process to develop the proposal.
In this Article, I only wanted to use Professor Catdi Backer's gracious
invitation to join this Symposium as a way to introduce the idea.

47. In addition to these explicit authorities, public international law also recognizes that
international organizations have implied powers necessary for their functions and not
inconsistent with their express authorities. See John W. Head, Suspension of Debtor,
supra note 50.
73. A recent self-study by the Fund noted its incipient openness to increased
transparency:
Until the late 1980s, institutional transparency was not high on the agenda of
the IMF ....
The IMF saw itself as a technical institution, accountable to its
member governments and with little need to explain itself to the wider
public .... Since then, remarkable progress has been made in a short period of
time .... The [external] institutional discourse has been broadened.... While
the public record appears impressive, further improvements are possible.
See LEO VAN HOUTVEN, GOVERNANCE OF THE IMF: DECISION MAKING, INSTITUTIONAL
OVERSIGHT, TRANSPARENCY, AND ACCOUNTABILITY 58-60 (Fund 2002).

